doctors to make judgm ents within " the context o f a nationally pro m ulgated needs form ula." Both Cooper and Culyer feel that the defects o f the N H S can be remedied without major alterations in its structure or financing. They lay great stress on the need for improved information and analysis. As Culyer notes (1976:111) , " one cannot prove that less ignorance of the facts o f ill health and medical efficacy and more explicit analysis of the basis o f choice lead to better policy. But in view o f the alternatives, one has to believe that they d o ." The need for a reduction in the discretion o f doctors is also noted but little guidance is provided as to how this should be accomplished. Indeed, there is the hope that "often advice and information about the procedures adopted by others m ight be sufficient a corrective" (Culyer, 1976:149) .
The foregoing view is in sharp contrast to that held by Goodman and Lindsay. These economists feel that the defects o f the N H S are an inevitable consequence not o f poor information, but o f public sector provision o f health care. According to Goodman (1980:3) , " the defects o f the N H S follow logically from fundamental principles governing human behavior . . . they are the natural and inevitable consequence of placing health care in the hands o f the state." Lindsay (1980:1) sets a sim ilar tone for his study o f the N H S with the following statement concerning the British experience with the N H S:
This study searches that experience for results which may be ex pected to generalize to any system o f government intervention in the provision o f health care. There are fundamental economic func tions which m ust be performed in any industry-even the health care industry-and replacing a pricing system with government adm inistrative machinery will introduce biases in resource allocation which transcend alteration or reform o f the administrative structure.
W hile neither Goodm an nor Lindsay propose how the performance o f the British health care system m ight be improved, implicit in both their analyses is the proposition that such an improvement would require a substantial reduction in government involvement and a greater reliance on the private sector for health care provision. This proposition was argued more explicitly by Lees and Jew kes, earlier critics o f the N H S . According to Lees (1964:16 ) the defects o f the N H S " bring dangers for the quality o f medical care that cannot be removed without far-reaching reform ." " Public policy should seek to build a free medical market in place o f the N H S , with governmental control and tax finance playing a significant but discrim inating and subordinate role" (Lees, 1962:111) . A similar approach is argued for by Jew kes (1978:87) who asks:
Why is it impossible to reorganize the medical service so that the government would restrict itself to providing preventive medicine, medical research, free medical services for those who demonstrably could not afford them and perhaps a large measure o f support for capital expenditures, thus leaving the great mass o f the people to pay for their own services to a profession largely operating inde pendently o f government? Why should private voluntary insurance not relieve the majority o f the people o f the stresses associated with the unpredictability o f ill-health?
The determination o f which o f these two different views o f the N H S is correct has important consequences for health care reform in the United States. Advocates o f national health insurance tend now adays to be rather sparing in their praise o f the N H S, arguing that it is badly managed, and reserve such praise rather for Canadian and other systems. However, if the problems o f the N H S are rooted in public sector provision o f health care, then it would be clearly unwise to dism iss the N H S as simply a good idea gone wrong. In this paper, I shall attem pt to develop a middle position between these two schools o f thought. I shall argue that the bureaucratic structure o f the N H S has an important impact on its performance in terms o f efficiency and access, and that problems in efficiency and access cannot therefore be alleviated by better information and analysis alone. I shall also argue that movement towards a system o f private insurance as exists in the United States is unlikely to alleviate these problems and that con structive reform o f the N H S is possible provided that it involves modification o f the incentives facing decision makers. The economic theories o f bureaucracy as developed by Niskanen (1971) , Downs (1967) , and others will be used to provide insight into the problems o f inefficiency and unequal access in the N H S and into possible reforms aimed at reducing these problems. It should be emphasized here that problems o f efficiency and access exist to some degree with any health care system. My position is only that economic theories o f bureau cracies help explain a significant part o f it. 
Characteristics of a Bureaucracy
In defining the term " bureaucracy," it is important to stress that the term is used here in a neutral sense, stripped of the negative con notations that often surround it in popular discourse. The term is used simply as a way of describing the economic characteristics of the organization. W hile definitions can differ, the bureaucracy is defined here as an organization that has the following three characteristics. First, the output o f the organization is paid for not directly by the consumers o f that output but by some third party or sponsor. The organization is divorced from its output market (Downs, 1967) . Sec ond, those working within the organization cannot easily appropriate for themselves any organizational cost savings generated by their own efforts. The rewards and costs which accrue to bureaucrats are either unrelated or only indirectly related to their contributions to the ef ficiency o f the organization. Third, the organization is a monopoly with respect to the services that it provides. Competition is weak or nonexistent.
The above definition of " bureaucracy" clearly differs from that de veloped by M ax Weber. W eber's definition focuses on characteristics common to all large modern organizations, such as the use of hier archies and rules. The definition used here, however, distinguishes a bureaucracy from other organizations on the basis o f third-party financing, the scheme o f compensation for officials and its monopoly status.
To a large extent the N H S possesses these characteristics. W hile charges are imposed, primarily for prescriptions and dental and ophthalmic services, less than 4 percent of N H S spending is financed by user charges, 89 percent is financed by general taxation, and 7 percent is financed by social security payroll taxes. Doctors, while clinically responsible for their actions, are generally not held account able for the resource implications o f their decisions. Also, " budget holders within the N H S who manage to achieve economies frequently find their budgets cut and the savings used to cover expenditure elsewhere in the health service" (Royal Commission on the National Health Service, 1979:348) . There is little opportunity, therefore, for N H S officials to either reap the benefits of cost-saving efforts or suffer the consequences o f waste. Finally, while private practice exists in Britain and is grow ing, the N H S has a virtual monopoly with respect to medical care. It is the normal source o f care for about 95 percent o f the population. Private insurance covers three m illion persons but offers coverage only for some services. There is some potential for competition between general practitioners within the N H S , since patients are free to switch doctors. However, most patients do not appear to aggressively exercise this option, and some doctors are reluctant to accept patients who wish to switch (Goodman, 1980) . If the N H S , then, is a bureaucracy in the sense that I have defined it, certain inferences can be drawn regarding efficiency in the delivery o f health care and access to health care within the British health care system. Before drawing these inferences, however, it is important to stress that an assumption is made that N H S officials are no more or less public-spirited, honest, efficient, or hard-working than those outside the N H S. The inferences to be drawn follow from the char acteristics o f the N H S outlined above and not from any particular incompetence or malfeasance on the part o f N H S officials.
Efficiency
Efficiency is defined here as ensuring that health care resources are used for the least-cost production o f those health care services that are most highly valued by society (Maynard and Ludbrook, 1980a) . As noted previously, the formation o f the N H S was motivated in significant part by a desire for greater efficiency. A national health service was seen as a means to bring greater formal structure and planning to a fragmented and chaotic health care system (Lindsay, 1980) . However, the characteristics of the bureaucracy outlined above do not lend much support to the idea that structure and efficiency are necessarily related.
First, since a bureaucracy does not charge customers for its services, it is difficult for the bureaucracy or its sponsor to evaluate its outputs in relation to costs. For example, in the absence of price, it is difficult to value the differing degrees o f relief o f pain, discomfort, and distress provided by health care procedures. Certainly, given the problems which characterize health care markets, such as lack o f consumer information, price cannot provide a fully accurate measure o f value; but as Culyer (1976:5) notes, prices "do, at the m inim um , indicate an element (if only part o f the picture) in the social value o f health care." O ften, one is forced to measure N H S output in terms of activities or inputs. This measurement problem is important for it reduces the ability o f the sponsor, Parliament in this case, to monitor the efficiency o f the bureaucracy's delivery of services. This in turn reduces the external pressure that the sponsor can bring to bear on the bureaucracy to improve efficiency. Second, the monopoly status of a bureaucracy further weakens external pressure for efficiency. The sponsor, Parliament, does not have sufficient information to assess what is the m inim um cost o f a given service level or how far the bureaucracy's costs are in excess o f this m inim um . It m ust rely largely on information provided by the bureaucracy itself and is therefore not in a strong position to gauge the cost-effectiveness o f the bureaucracy's activities and bring to bear external pressure to improve efficiency. Third, since individuals working in a bureaucracy are generally not rewarded for cost-savings efforts and are not held financially responsible for the resource consequences o f their decisions, internal incentives for efficiency are weak.
The absence o f effective measures o f performance, combined with weak external and internal pressures for efficiency, means that those working within the bureaucracy can enjoy greater discretion concern ing the activities they perform, the rate at which they perform those activities, and the quality o f their performance. This leads to an increase in what Liebenstein (1976) has termed x-inefficiency (an excess of actual cost over m inim um cost). Particularly important in the N H S is the discretion enjoyed by the medical profession. In the absence of measures o f performance and pressures for efficiency, the N H S has been prepared to rely heavily upon the subjective judgm ent o f its experts, the doctors, in m aking resource-allocation decisions. Since medicine is not an exact science, this has meant that considerable variation has been perm itted in medical practice. H ospital stays vary widely for the same medical condition and general practitioners vary considerably in their referrals o f patients to specialists and hospitals. Most o f the m edical procedures now in use have not been rigorously tested or their value proven. Indeed, how much inefficiency exists as a result o f the exercise o f such discretion is almost impossible to assess because in the absence o f internal incentives for efficiency, doctors themselves have been reluctant to evaluate the clinical effectiveness, less still the cost effectiveness, o f alternative treatments.
The bureaucratic structure o f the N H S also inhibits efficiency in another, more subtle, fashion. Since a bureaucracy is a monopoly and since it is not dependent directly on its consumers for financial support, one would expect it to be rather unresponsive to the preferences of its consumers. The monopoly status o f the bureaucracy lim its options available to customers dissatisfied with its services. Also, the absence o f direct financial support from consumers reduces the cost to the bureaucracy resulting from a loss o f disaffected consumers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the N H S often appears to be indifferent to the preferences o f its patients. As Cooper (1 9 7 5 :9 3 -9 4 ) so eloquently notes, O utpatient departments often seem to be run for the maximum convenience o f consultants whilst patient time is valued at naught. Appointm ent systems which give everyone the same time still exist: the standard o f comfort whilst waiting often compares unfavorably with British Rail w aiting rooms. . . . Patients are too often treated as being uniformly stupid and afforded no privacy and little dignity.
Such bureaucratic indifference to patient preferences may often re duce the cost to the N H S o f delivering services. However, it also imposes costs on patients by reducing the value o f services received. Since the N H S does not bear the latter costs, some inefficiency seems likely.
It should be emphasized that these signs o f inefficiency can also be found in many other health care systems in the world. The ar gum ent being made here is not that the N H S is uniquely inefficient but rather, contrary to the expectations o f early supporters o f the N H S , its bureaucratic structure, far from prom oting greater efficiency, has allowed inefficiency to go relatively unchecked. Also, as will be indicated later, any system o f health care based on extensive thirdparty coverage, including the U .S. health care system, shares to a significant degree the three bureaucratic characteristics which en courage inefficiency.
Interestingly enough, in one important respect, the bureaucratic structure o f the N H S may have actually helped reduce inefficiency. In particular, the monopoly status o f the N H S may help it keep its spending levels within budget lim its set by Parliament. This is because budgetary controls at an administrative level rest in fewer hands. Also, its monopoly status gives the N H S some degree of market power in negotiating the level o f remuneration o f doctors, dentists, phar macists, and opticians and in the purchase o f drugs and other medical supplies. Furthermore, the N H S , as a monopoly, can more easily restrict the access o f patients to specialist doctors. Patient access to specialists in the N H S is granted customarily on the basis o f referral by general practitioners. This control over access to the specialist "may well be a key variable in the cost o f the whole health system" (Maxwell, 1981:88) .
O f course, some would question whether cost containment in Britain promotes efficiency so much as underprovision. Indeed, there is a widespread perception that the N H S is underfinanced. In evidence to the Royal Com m ission on the National Health Service (1979:334) , the British M edical Association states that " for some years now the money allocated by the Government for the service has been quite inadequate to meet the demands made upon it by the p u b lic." Whether the N H S is underfinanced in the sense that the benefits to society from extra health care services would exceed their cost is open to question since, as noted earlier, it is difficult to place a value on N H S services. Certainly, there is evidence that budget stringency has limited the ability o f the N H S to make available new medical tech nology to its patients (Goodman, 1980) . For example, the N H S in 1976 accepted only 15 patients per million population for renal di alysis, a considerably lower proportion than are accepted in the United States. As Maxwell notes (1981:96) , "decisions to restrict health-care expenditures ultim ately involve curtailing or withholding treatment for important human conditions." This becomes increasingly true as the rapid rate o f technological innovation brings an increasing array of sophisticated but expensive medical procedures, drugs, and equipment.
Nonetheless, it can be argued that not all treatments offered are effective and humane. A recent study conducted at a university hospital in the U nited States found that 9 percent o f patients on a general medical service suffered an iatrogenic illness that was considered major in that it threatened life or produced considerable disability (Steel et al., 1981) . In addition, given the lack o f incentives for efficiency in the N H S noted earlier, if the N H S were to enjoy substantially higher levels o f funding, there is no guarantee that those extra funds would be spent on the most cost-effective forms of treatment in terms of preventing suffering and saving lives. Arguments for increased funding are in any case weakened by the lack of association between indicators of health status and health care resources. This lack o f association seems to hold even when fairly refined measures o f health status are used, such as high blood pressure and high cholesterol levels (Newhouse and Friedlander, 1980) . Therefore, while budget stringency undoubtedly contributes in some cases to inconvenience and suffering by patients, its overall impact on health levels may be quite small, at least for the present.
Access to Health Care
Equal access to health care without regard to ability to pay has traditionally been a major objective o f the N H S. The bureaucratic structure o f the N H S would seem to contribute to this objective in two ways. First, since consumers do not pay directly for most services, price is not a barrier to consumption. Second, the monopoly status o f the N H S means that it is not simply a health service for the poor and medically indigent but the normal source o f health care for all but a small fraction of the population. However, as will be noted below, this conclusion may not hold for all N H S services.
In discussing equality of access, it is important to note that rates of morbidity tend to be higher among the lower socioeconomic groups than among upper socioeconomic groups. For this reason, equality of access has frequently been defined in terms of each group having the rate of use that their rate of morbidity would indicate. Viewing equality in these terms, there is some dispute as to whether the N H S has in fact achieved equality of access. A number of studies have indicated that the lower social classes make less use o f primary health care than their higher self-reported rates of morbidity would warrant (see, for example, LeGrand, 1978; Department o f Health and Social Security, 1980) . However, in a recent article, Collins and Klein (1980) have drawn attention to a methodological problem in these studies. Because of data limitations, researchers were forced to assume that, for each socioeconomic group, those making use of the N H S were also necessarily among those reporting morbidity. Following an anal ysis drawn from General Household Survey data on use o f services related to morbidity, they conclude that:
The N H S has achieved equity in terms of access to primary care: there is no consistent bias against the lower socioeconomic groups and in the case of some health care categories, these have propor tionately higher rates of access than their rates of self-reported morbidity would indicate.
Collins and K lein 's results lend some support to the notion that the bureaucratic characteristics o f the N H S help promote equal access to health care. However, they look only at primary care services and LeGrand (1982) argues that their results are therefore not valid for all N H S services. Certainly, the doctor is likely to play a larger role in the patient's demand for other services, and there is no guarantee that the doctor will use the discretion he enjoys in the bureaucracy to promote equality o f access to such services. As Culyer et al. (1981: 144) note, the doctor " is in a position to ration access using nonpecuniary criteria such as clinical condition, age, sex, color, religion, socioeconomic class, actual or potential nuisance values and so o n ." While the N H S may therefore have obtained some success in en couraging equal access to primary care, the picture is less clear with respect to health care services as a whole. Also, the bureaucratic structure o f the N H S does not clearly promote regional equality o f access. Indeed, a reasonable argument can be made that the opposite may well be true. Given the difficulties in measuring bureaucratic performance, there is an increased incentive for both the bureaucracy and its sponsor to rely upon incremental strategies in form ulating budgets so that this year's budget is largely a function o f last year's budget. As a result, inequalities in resources between departments and regions would be expected to persist over time. This appears to be what has happened to the N H S, at least up until the last decade. Since 1970, more vigorous efforts have been made to equalize budget resources between regions by introducing increasingly complex budget allocation formulae, and there are signs that these efforts are meeting with some success (Maynard and Ludbrook, 1980b) . Even if equalization o f budget resources were attained, variations in efficiency between regions would still lead to continuing inequalities in service levels (Maynard and Ludbrook, 1980a) . The improvement o f efficiency and access are thus related objectives.
A further problem with respect to access to health care is the waiting lists for hospital care. M ost o f those on the lists are waiting for surgery. Although waiting lists have fallen in recent years and al though " emergency" cases have top priority and are treated im m e diately, there is some concern over the possible risks to health that may result in some cases from waiting for treatment. W hile waiting lists are not unique to the British health care system, there is reason to believe that waiting time assumes a greater importance as a ra tioning device in a bureaucracy. As Downs (1967:188) notes, " orga nizations that cannot charge money for their services m ust develop nonmonetary costs to impose on their clients as a means o f rationing their o u tp u t." W aiting tim e, therefore, may be seen as a form of nonprice rationing for at least some services in the N H S bureaucracy. Lindsay (1980: 2) argues that in the N H S: " Health care (with par ticular reference to hospital care) is rationed on the basis of people's willingness to suffer delay in its delivery . . . Access to hospital care no longer goes to those willing to pay the most for it. It goes to those willing to wait longest to receive it ."
Lindsay develops a rather elegant but simple model o f waiting time based on supply and demand analysis. H is characterization o f the rationing process is, however, somewhat misleading for it implies that some patients are deterred from joining the list as a result o f the costs associated with waiting. Since the chief waiting costs such as anxiety, pain, and inconvenience m ust be endured whether or not the patient joins the list, it is difficult to see how such costs would deter patients from joining. W hile Lindsay's model, therefore, may be appropriate for explaining the demand for general practitioners' services where patients may incur time costs in waiting rooms, an alternative explanation o f the rationing process for hospital services is required.
In order to properly understand how waiting time acts as a rationing mechanism, it is important to focus on the decision m aking o f doctors. As Cooper (1975) notes, since medical need is often difficult to de termine, N H S doctors tend to assess need in line with resource con straints. Also, former Minister o f Health Enoch Powell (1976) has indicated that the assignment o f such terms as " emergency" and " urgent" to patients on the waiting list is influenced by the availability of medical treatment. This appears to confirm Downs' (1967:188) hypothesis that in a bureaucracy "requests for free services always rise to meet the capacity o f the producing agency. " In the N H S , waiting time serves as an indicator o f producing capacity. Hence, doctors will be more likely to place patients on hospital waiting lists when w aiting time is short than when it is long. It is perhaps also not surprising then that both Feldstein (1964) and Culyer and Cullis (1975) have found that waiting lists do not fall with increases in supply. Rather, supply increases " encourage [general practitioners] to refer more pa tients to hospitals, and hospital doctors to assign more people to the waiting list until a more or less 'conventional' waiting time is again reached" (Culyer, 1976:99) .
Implications for Reform
The foregoing analysis indicates that economic theories of bureaucracy do provide significant insight into both the good and bad aspects of N H S performance in terms o f efficiency and access. If this analysis is correct, then improvements in information and analysis alone are unlikely to alleviate inefficiency and unequal access. At the same time, however, it would be wrong to imply that the problem is simply one o f excessive government involvement in health care. The United States health care system , which is characterized by considerably less gov ernment involvement, also possesses to a significant degree the three characteristics o f a bureaucracy. Extensive public and private thirdparty financing, particularly in the hospital sector, means that pro ducers are divorced from their output markets. Also, insurance reim bursement policies, in large part based explicitly or implicitly on costs incurred, means that hospital cost-savings efforts yield limited benefits to hospital decision makers. Furthermore, extensive third-party cov erage reduces the incentive o f patients guided by their doctors to shop around for hospital care and alternatives to hospital care, and reduces already weak competitive forces.
Therefore, in spite o f the considerably smaller role of government in health care, the American health care system already resembles a bureaucracy as defined in this paper. W hat distinguishes the American health care system from the British system in terms of the above analysis is the absence o f budget lim its. It is increasingly a bureaucracy without budget lim its. The Reagan administration has sought budget lim its, but since these would only apply to government and not private health care spending, their effect may be simply to shift a greater portion o f health care costs to other third-party payers rather than to contain costs. Also, it is not surprising, then, that examples o f inefficiency sim ilar to those found in the N H S also exist in the United States, for example, variations in hospital admissions rates and hospital stays.
The United States' experience does not then provide strong support for those who argue that the best way to improve efficiency is to simply reduce government involvement. Extensive third-party fi nancing even in market systems o f health care encourages substantial inefficiency. Furthermore, a reduction o f government involvement would seem unlikely to bring the British health care system closer to the goal o f equal access. Indeed, Maynard and Ludbrook (1980a: 39) argue that an " unrestricted market system would result in resources being attracted to high income areas." Improvements in N H S performance, particularly in the area of efficiency, lie in some modification o f one or more o f the three bu reaucratic characteristics of the N H S. In this vein, it is interesting to note that the Royal Commission on the National Health Service (1979:348) suggested that budget holders be "permitted to keep and spend a proportion o f any savings they may achieve and possibly be allowed to carry over a greater proportion o f funds from one budget period to the next." Also, the commission recommended that exper iments with clinician budgeting be encouraged. Clinician budgeting would make doctors budget holders and, thus, accountable for the expenditure generated by their decisions. These budgetary innovations would modify the bureaucracy's basic characteristics in that they would allow N H S decision makers to appropriate a portion o f cost savings earned at least indirectly in the form o f extra discretionary budget funds. W hile less effective than a system o f personal rewards and penalties, this type o f reform would probably be more politically feasible. However, it should be noted here that such reforms do nothing to modify the two other characteristics o f the N H S bureau cracy (the divorce o f the N H S from its output market, and its mo nopoly status) so that external monitoring of N H S performance would remain weak. As a result, there is danger that budgetary incentives m ight induce budget holders to cut costs by reducing either the level or quality o f services provided. Therefore, measures of service output would need to be developed and monitored.
W illiam Niskanen's theory of the bureaucracy (1971) suggests more radical alternatives. For example, the N H S could be broken up into a number o f self-contained units competing with each other for bud gets on the basis o f their performance. Competition between agencies for health care budget resources would place Parliament in a much stronger position to assess evidence o f performance provided by a single agency. Com petition between agencies for patients would tend to reduce bureaucratic indifference to consumer preferences. In order to avoid wasteful duplication o f present buildings and equipment, the transition from a monopolistic to a competitive N H S could be gradual. For example, competing agencies m ight initially share the present facilities o f larger hospitals. Each agency would be responsible for recommending adm ission o f its patients and would be charged by the hospitals for the full cost o f treating its patients. Across time, however, except where economies of scale were evident, com peting agencies could be perm itted to acquire an increasing range of their own medical facilities.
Alternatively, the government could provide health care vouchers to consumers who could use them to procure services either from the N H S or from com peting private health care plans. The latter type of reform would be sim ilar to that advocated for the United States by Enthoven (1980) . As Klein notes (1978:73) , the approach " makes optim istic assum ptions about the information available to consumers and about the willingness o f providers to engage in com petition." Nonetheless, the American experience with prepaid plans suggests that the approach is worth investigating. Such an investigation m ight take the form o f a lim ited number of local experimental voucher programs in selected cities.
Economic theories o f bureaucracy, then, in addition to providing insights into the performance o f the N H S , also suggest directions for constructive reform. These go beyond the improvements in infor mation and analysis advocated by Cooper and Culyer in that they modify the incentives faced by health care providers. They need not, however, entail a substantial lessening o f government involvement in health care or the abolition o f the N H S. As such, they provide a basis for hoping that improvements in efficiency in the British health care system can be secured while maintaining and perhaps even im proving the extent o f equality in access to health care.
